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China and Central Asia:
 A Significant New Energy Nexus
By Fakhmiddin Fazilov & Xiangming Chen
China now accounts for almost 20 percent of the world’s 
energy consumption and its demand is still growing at high 
speed. In order to keep up with the expanding industry China 
turns to Central Asia with ambitious gas line projects and 
considers countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan to be key factors in its energy security nexus. 
A Rising China Reshaping the Global Energy 
Landscape
The growth of  China’s economy at historically unprece-
dented speed and scale over the last three decades has com-
pletely altered the supply-demand equation of  global energy. 
Its galloping manufacturing machine has been running on 
massive quantities of  coal and oil. From a country with no 
private cars to the largest auto market in the world, China has 
dramatically accelerated its petrol consumption. With mil-
lions of  skyscrapers and lower buildings of  all kinds shooting 
up in its hundreds of  large cities that have to be cooled and 
heated, China has become a giant in the overall consumption 
of  energy by the world’s cities. Given its limited domestic 
supply of  oil and gas, China has to get this massive amount 
of  new energy from somewhere else in the world. It is the 
combination of  the quantity and sources of  China’s added 
demand for energy that has spun a new web of  global and 
regional geo-economic ties involving Central Asia and other 
regions such as Latin America.1
The nature and trajectory of  China’s rising energy 
demand have been shaped by the model and scale of  its eco-
nomic growth. China has built a huge number of  export-
oriented factories of  massive scale in what can be called 
factory-cities along its coast, some of  which employ almost 
one million workers like Foxconn’s factory in Shenzhen. 
Moreover, China has put up gigantic buildings and trans-
port infrastructure in these cities where millions of  affluent 
consumers live and drive. Nothing like this conjuncture of  
powerful forces has happened in the history of  industrial-
ization, urbanization and modernization. As a result, China 
has become world’s largest energy consumer in less than 
20 years, accounting for almost 20 percent of  the world’s 
total energy consumption now (see Figure 1). This has also 
turned China into the world’s second largest net importer of  
oil today, from being an oil exporter in the 1990s (see Figure 
2). Looking forward, China’s energy demand is expected to 
expand 75 percent by 2035 when its lead over the United 
States will be much larger (Figure 1).
Although China has a substantial domestic supply of  
energy, especially coal, it has been looking abroad for more 
and more sources of  oil and gas. China produced an esti-
mated 4.3 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of  oil liquids 
in 2011, which is forecast to rise to 4.5 million bbl/d by 
the end of  2013. However, its booming economy requires 
China to import more than 50 percent of  the oil it needs. 
According to the US Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), China may import about 75 percent of  the crude oil 
it will consume by 2035.2
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aims to compete aggressively for its energy security by devel-
oping its “energy diplomacy” with the region. Secondly, 
developing close ties with Central Asia through an energy 
nexus will help China deter threats from the separatist activ-
ists in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. China has 
reorganized the army units in Xinjiang to safeguard its oil 
fields given the 3,300 km western border with Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The root of  connections between the Central Asian coun-
tries and China goes all the way back to the Silk Road times. 
Diplomatic relations between China and the Central Asian 
countries have been established since the collapse of  the 
Soviet Union in 1991-1992. Trade between China and the 
five Central Asian countries rose from $527 million in 1992 
to $40 billion in 2011.7 China has increased its investment 
in building roads and tunnels in Tajikistan, developing the 
oil sector in Kazakhstan and constructing a 1,800-kilometer 
natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan.  In Central Asia, 
China has sought to establish a regional free trade zone, 
partially as a way of  tapping into the region’s vast energy 
resources. Nowadays, the major Chinese energy players 
in the region are China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(SINOPEC) and Petro China. They have partnered with 
local companies to compete with traditional power players 
like Russia and multinational companies such as Chevron, 
ExxonMobile and BP in the exploration and extraction of  
oil and natural gas.
Two main pipelines from Central Asia to China, the 
Central Asia-China gas pipeline and Kazakhstan-China oil 
China’s rapidly growing demand for energy is fueled by 
its energy-intensive industries like steel, aluminum, auto-
mobiles, electronics and chemicals. China now accounts for 
about 35 percent of  the world’s steel production and about 
50 percent of  the world’s cement production.  By the year 
2030, the number of  cars in China is projected to increase to 
400 million from 27 million cars in 2004,3 driving up consid-
erably more energy consumption. Natural gas consumption 
in China has also risen over the past decade. In 2011, China 
produced 3.6 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of  natural gas, 9 percent 
more than in 2010. While natural gas accounted for 23.7 
percent of  global energy consumption in 2011, it was only 
4.5 percent in China. China’s domestic gas is not enough to 
meet the needs of  these growing industries, which pushed 
China’s gas import to jump from 12 percent of  its consump-
tion in 2010 to 22 percent in 2011.4 
In response to its tremendous energy needs, the Chinese 
government has elevated its energy policy to a very high 
priority. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently 
noted that oil security has emerged as a central policy in 
China,5 leading China to diversify its access to energy 
resources globally. China imports a vast amount of  energy 
from the Middle East, Africa, Asia-Pacific and other coun-
tries. In 2011, the Middle East, including Iran, supplied 
2.6 million bbl/d (51 percent) to China, Africa 1.2 million 
bbl/d (24 percent), the Asia-Pacific region 173,000 bbl/d (3 
percent), and other countries 1.1 million bbl/d (22 percent).6 
China has become heavily dependent on a number of  distant 
countries in the Middle East and Africa with low political 
stability. To ameliorate this dependence, China has begun 
to diversify its international energy sources by sponsoring 
the development of  China-bound pipelines in Myanmar 
(Burma), Central Asia and Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Central 
Asian vector of  China’s energy policy has become consider-
ably more important.
China’s Turn to Central Asia for Energy Supply
Of  the non-Middle Eastern energy sources for China, 
Central Asia looms large and close due to its abundance of  
oil and natural gas deposits and relative regional stability. 
Central Asia accounts for about 4 percent of  global energy 
deposits. The oil reserves in Central Asia and along the 
Caspian Sea coast amount to 17 to 33 bbl/d, which are com-
parable to that of  Qatar. China has turned to Central Asia 
for energy supply, for two main reasons. Besides accessing 
a more stable and closer source of  abundant energy, China 
The International Energy Agency noted 
that oil security has emerged as a central 
policy in China, leading China to diversify 
its access to energy resources globally.
China has increased its investment in build-
ing roads and tunnels in Tajikistan, devel-
oping the oil sector in Kazakhstan and 
constructing a 1,800-kilometer natural gas 
pipeline from Turkmenistan.
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pipeline, are already in operation. The 
Central Asia-China gas pipeline, span-
ning Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, and crossing Xingjian 
Uyghur Autonomous Republic at the 
border town of  Horgos, transported 40 
billion cubic meters (bcm) of  natural 
gas when it was first built. It is con-
nected with China's second west-east 
gas pipeline, which starts from Horgos 
and ends in Hong Kong, stretching 
8,704 km. China imported about 18.4 
bcm of  natural gas through its first 
cross-border pipeline the last two years. 
Given China’s plan to increase gas 
imports from Central Asia by five times 
by 2015, the Central Asia-China pipe-
line’s capacity will expand up to 55-60 
billion cubic meters of  gas per year.8
The further development of  China’s 
Central Asian energy pipeline projects 
will involve a China-Arab line to the 
oil terminals of  the Persian Gulf. These 
energy corridors will ultimately place 
China in the center of  a “Pan-Asian 
global energy bridge,” which will link 
existing and potential suppliers (Persian 
Gulf  countries, Central Asia and 
Russia) to the major energy consumers 
(China, Japan and Korea). If  success-
ful, it will not only improve the energy 
security of  China, but also strengthen 
Beijing’s broader geo-political influence 
in the region.
The Sino-Kazakhstan Energy Ties
Its massive oil reserves make 
Kazakhstan very attractive to China 
in boosting energy cooperation. 
Kazakhstan’s total proven offshore and 
onshore fields’ reserves constitute about 
37 billion barrels of  oil and 3.3 tril-
lion cubic meters (tcm) of  natural gas, 
making Kazakhstan one of  the world's 
major oil producers with the potential 
to expand the production of  2 million 
bbl/d in 2010 to 3.5 million bbl/d by 
2015. Kazakhstan’s reserves of  natural 
The discovery of  Kazakhstan’s 
giant Kashagan oil field, which was 
considered “the largest oil discov-
ery anywhere in the world in the past 
20 years,”10 has prompted China to 
reconsider its position regarding the 
feasibility of  Kazakhstan-China pipe-
line. As a result, the easternmost part 
of  the pipeline, running 988 km from 
Atasu in Kazakhstan to Alashankou at 
the Chinese border (see Map 1A), was 
completed at the end of  2005 and began 
operating in May 2006, with a total 
investment of  $700 million.11 The 962 
km long pipeline has been operating as 
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gas are around 8.6 tcm.
Chinese energy companies have 
been operating and investing in 
Kazakhstan where CNPC acquired 
60.3 percent of  shares of  Kazakh oil 
company Aktobemunaigaz in 1997. 
CNPC later bought the entire shares 
of  the company and re-established 
CNPC–Aktobemunaigaz. In addi-
tion, CNPC is in negotiation to buy a 
49% minority stake in Kazakhstan’s 
AO MangistauMunaigaz Company 
from KazMunaiGaz. This deal gives 
China control over about 15 percent of  
Kazakhstan’s total oil output.9 
Kazakhstan’s total proven offshore and onshore fields’ reserves constitute about 37 billion 
barrels of oil and 3.3 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of natural gas, making Kazakhstan one of 
the world's major oil producers with the potential to expand the production. 
Further development of Sino-Kazakhstan energy coopera-
tion may bring more opportunities to the region. Kazakhstan 
and China have considered three opportunities. 
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a 50-50 joint venture between state companies CNPC and 
KazMunaiGaz. At the beginning, this pipeline was expected 
to ship one million barrels per day of  crude oil into western 
China or 10 million tons of  crude oil per year, but the pipe-
line is expected to increase its export capacity to 20 million 
tons in the future.12  
Further development of  Sino-Kazakhstan energy 
cooperation may bring more opportunities to the region. 
Kazakhstan and China have considered three opportunities. 
The first is to prolong the existing pipeline between cities of  
Uzbekistan-Bukhara and Tashkent to Almaty, then through 
Taldikorgan to Alashankou. The second is the construction 
of  a new gas pipeline connecting Ishim (western Siberia) 
and Alashankou and the one going through Astana and 
Karaganda. The third is a variant of  constructing a pipeline 
from Shalkar (western Kazakhstan) and one coming through 
Kizilorda until Shimkent, with connection to the pipeline 
Bukhara-Tashkent-Almaty.13  
Is energy cooperation mutually beneficial to both China 
and Kazakhstan? China considers Kazakhstan a key factor 
in its energy security nexus, and sees the cooperation as 
helping strengthen and secure its northwestern borders of  
the volatile Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The 
cooperation also provides new energy to support China’s 
“Go West” program and helps it gain greater access to the 
markets of  Central Asia. Some experts see the increasing 
Sino-Kazakh cooperation in the energy field as tied to the 
long-term strategic interests of  the two countries, especially 
when faced with greater U.S. military presence in Central 
Asia after September 11.14 For Kazakhstan, China can help 
diversify its energy sector by balancing against Russia’s 
influence in its energy field.
The future of  Sino-Kazakhstan energy cooperation will 
depend on the exploration of  new oil deposits in the shelf  
areas of  the Caspian Sea, which may strengthen Chinese 
companies’ presence in the region at the expense of  
European, American and Russian companies. The political 
and economic contents of  developing energy relations further 
may be tied to the framework of  the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), especially under the auspices of  SCO’s 
newly established “Energy Club.”
Turkmenistan and Uzibekstan in China’s 
Energy Policy
Turkmenistan is one of  the world’s largest natural gas 
exporters. According to Oil and Gas Journal, Turkmenistan 
has proven natural gas reserves of  approximately 265 trillion 
cubic feet (Tcf) in 2012.15 The abundance of  natural gas 
has drawn significant attention and interest from China. 
Diplomatic relations between two countries were established 
after the independence of  Turkmenistan in 1992. Given the 
significant energy component in their bilateral relations, 
the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline project – as part of  
the Central Asia-China pipeline – came into existence. The 
Central Asia-China gas pipeline begins in Turkmenistan and 
goes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before connecting 
to a second pipeline running west to east within China (see 
Map 1b). China and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in 
July 2007 under which the latter would supply 30 bcm of  gas 
to China annually through pipelines for 30 years. It began 
supplying gas on December 14, 2009.
The President of  Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhammedov, said during a state visit to Beijing on 
November 23, 2009 that Turkmenistan would increase its 
gas exports to a volume of  65 bcm a year.16 According to 
CNPC, Turkmenistan has transported more than 30 bcm of  
natural gas to China in more than 900 days using the Central 
Asia-China pipeline, an amount making up a fifth of  the 
gas China used last year. Of  the 30 bcm, about 10.7 bcm 
came from the CNPC (Turkmenistan) Amu Darya River 
Gas Co, and Turkmenistan's Natural Gas Konzern supplied 
the remaining 19.3 bcm.17 Turkmenistan is expected to be 
China’s principal supplier of  natural gas via the pipeline that 
traverses through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. By strength-
ening its energy relations with Turkmenistan, China not only 
attempts to diversify its access to the new gas but also gains 
greater flexibility in navigating the treacherous geopolitics 
of  the region.
The evolution of  energy cooperation between China and 
Turkmenistan should benefit both sides. Turkmenistan ben-
efits from doubling its energy supply to China and circum-
venting its biggest competitors – Iran and Russia. Beijing wins 
by securing new gas supplies and thus postpones plans to 
deal with Iran until the political climate of  the Middle East 
improves.18 According to IEA, China’s natural gas import will 
be around 30-40 bcm, and this amount could be covered by 
Turkmenistan with its 60 bcm annual export capacity. China’s 
consumption will lie in the range of  180 bcm to 200 bcm, and 
production in the range of  120 bcm to 140 bcm by 2020. Based 
on this assumption, the gap between demand and domestic 
production by 2020 will amount to between 40 bcm and 80 
bcm.19 This will reinforce China’s interest and need to buy 
more gas from Turkmenistan.
Like with other Central Asian countries, China’s overall 
relationship with Uzbekistan has improved over the last two 
decades, which has contributed to a deeper and more mutu-
ally beneficial cooperation in energy. According to Oil and 
Gas Journal, Uzbekistan holds an estimated 65 tcf  of  proven 
natural gas reserves as of  2012, ranking it the fourth highest 
in the Eurasia region and nineteenth in the world.20 To 
gain access to this rich gas reserve, China has made major 
The future of Sino-Kazakhstan energy 
cooperation will depend on the explora-
tion of new oil deposits in the shelf areas 
of the Caspian Sea.
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gains by attracting Chinese investment to its energy sector 
with spillovers to other sectors of  its economy. China’s 
investment in Uzbekistan now exceeds $4 billion. China has 
already become Uzbekstan’s largest investor, third largest 
trading partner, largest buyer of  cotton, and largest provider 
of  telecommunications equipment.24
Replaying the Great Game, in Energy
As China has risen to the central gravity of  the global 
economy, it has brought Central Asia into the field of  that 
gravity through various energy connections. One should 
not be surprised by this parallel or paired development 
into a new regional energy nexus. For centuries, China and 
Central Asia were linked through peace, war, trade and 
marriage, with the exception of  the last 100 years when 
Central Asia fell into the orbit of  tsarist Russian and Soviet 
influence, and became delinked from China. Are we seeing 
a replay of  a Great Game in Central Asia, in energy, with 
China and the United States replacing the former Soviet 
Union and Great Britain?25
It is quite clear that China has already fully (re)entered the 
arena where it plays aggressively to win a larger share of  the 
energy prize in Central Asia, while the United States may be 
relegated to a second-tier role as its private oil companies, large 
as they are like ExxonMobil, do not match up evenly against 
China’s powerful state-owned oil giants such as CNPC. In 
fact, the departure of  US and NATO troops from Afghanistan 
by the end of  2014 will open up more geo-strategic space for 
China to fill with its energy and diplomatic activities. It may 
also help China solidify the political stability of  Xinjiang bor-
dering Central Asia. In the longer run, China eyes Central 
Asia as the strategic crossroad for its long land route to trade 
with the Gulf  and Europe.   
In the short term, however, China needs to quell its thirst 
for Central Asia’s oil and gas that can be brought overland 
to power its factories on the eastern seaboard (Map 1b). 
Therefore, China will continue to devote its diplomatic 
energy to improving relations with the Central Asian coun-
tries to ensure a stable and substantial supply of  oil and 
natural gas that will reduce dependence on Middle Eastern 
oil and can avoid shipping it along the more vulnerable sea 
economic inroads into Uzbekistan where it has set up more 
than 380 ventures with Chinese investment and also the rep-
resentative offices of  65 large Chinese companies; among 
them, CITIC, CNPC and China Machinery.21
The twin anchors of  this cooperation are Uzbekistan’s 
national oil and gas company Uzbekneftegaz and Chinese 
CNPC. In 2004, CNPC signed a contract with Uzbekneftegaz 
on energy cooperation. In 2006, they signed two more agree-
ments to explore and develop prospective petroleum depos-
its in five onshore blocks of  the Aral Sea together with 
Russia’s Lukoil, Malaysia’s PETRONAS, and South Korea’s 
National Oil Corporation.22 A joint venture on oil explora-
tion between Uzbekneftegas and CNPC was established in 
the Mingbulak field. The intersection of  the Uzbekistan-
China gas pipeline into the Central Asia-China gas pipeline 
has added momentum to the energy cooperation between 
the two countries. Uzbekistan started to supply natural gas 
through this gas pipeline on August, 2012. As the China-
Central Asia pipeline is a double-line pipeline, including line 
A and line B, the construction of  line C with a length of  
1840 kilometers to parallel lines A and B was launched in 
2012, including a 157 km-long project undertaking by the 
China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau. The 3-line gas pipeline of  
Uzbekistan-China is projected to have a capacity of  25 bcm 
gas.23 This ambitious gas project adds to the bilateral eco-
nomic relations between China and Uzbekstan. Uzbekistan 
In the longer run, China eyes Central Asia as the strategic crossroad for its long land route to trade 
with the Gulf and Europe. In the short term, however, China needs to quell its thirst for Central 
Asia’s oil and gas that can be brought overland to power its factories on the eastern seaboard.
China has already become Uzibekstan’s 
largest investor, third largest trading 
partner, largest buyer of cotton, and largest 
provider of telecommunications equipment.
Capacity: 
30 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas
Length: 7.378 km 
Investment: 
125 billion yuan
Sources of gas: 
 - 25 billion cubic 
meters from Turk-
menistan, Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan.
 - 5 billion from the 
Xinjiang Uygur au-
tonomous region
CHINA’S THIRD WEST-TO-EAST NATURAL GAS 
TRANSMISSION LINE
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300km
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Map 1b. 
Sources: China National Petroleum Corp.
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route through the narrow Strait of  Malacca. In addition, 
Central Asia can help China diversify its energy supplies. 
Given China’s attempt to develop nuclear energy by con-
structing about 30 new nuclear power plants, Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan’s uranium deposits, which account for 
around one quarter of  the world’s uranium reserves, can 
meet China’s critical need.
In all its facets, the China-Central Asia regional energy 
nexus forms the axis of  a new Great Game that will play on 
for a long time. On one side, the five Central Asian states 
are plagued by poor relations, with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan conflicting over boundary and water issues, 
and the latter two remaining more dependent on Russia 
through remittance from their migrant workers. On the 
other side, China has been playing as a unified, rising power 
getting the amount of  energy that it wants and needs. This 
equation stands to favour China now and into the future as 
the regional energy nexus evolves in the larger geo-political 
context of  Eurasia. 
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China has been playing as a unified, rising power getting the amount of energy that it wants 
and needs. This equation stands to favour China now and into the future as the regional energy 
nexus evolves in the larger geo-political context of Eurasia.
